It is very common in contemporary posthuman reflection to propose certain moral attitude that is lofty named posthuman ethics. Lacking the idea of responsible individual – due to getting rid of the concept of a human – it is impossible to endue on anybody any moral responsibility. Transhuman thought does not commit this error, because it does not get rid of the concept of the human, also allowing recognition of other individuals – as cyborgs, androids, hybrids or upgraded animals.
Morality as practical attitude is derivative of ethics that is a conceptual system of values. One can be judged morally in reference to the relevant ethics. Ethical systems are social constructions allowing for smooth management of societies and communities. They are deeply internalized and though they vary in detail individually, they are usually co-owned within certain communities (that today might be dispersed physically and gathered online).
The first question therefore that should be asked is: can we think of morality and ethics that is cyborg, hybrid, or android, or in other words: can the cyborg, the hybrid or the android be moral? may they have some ethical system(s)? Then we neither loose a responsible individual, nor we just make moral claims without the ethical basis. Instead, we expand the concept of a person, so that it can include various persons, like human persons, cyborg persons, hybrid persons, android persons and possibly others. Expanding the notion of the person that might be differently embodied (and holding different sets of values) can be considered and expanding the boundaries of the Kantian Kingdom of Ends.
The detailed sciences are concerned with how to make a person’s life easier and more productive. However, they cannot answer the question of why it is good to be human at all. Moreover, for some time they have not been looking for a way to “improve” humans, which is hidden under the slogans “human enhancement” or “transhumanism.” However, if man in who he is as a human being needs to be “improved” or “enhanced,” that is, something is wrong with him. Perhaps he is merely the result of some error in the evolutionary process that needs to be corrected? However, if it is a mistake, the question is who would make the mistake? Whom, then, is science trying to correct? Is it at all possible to answer these questions on the ground of specific sciences, and if not, what is the dependence of these sciences on philosophy and theology?
The thesis on the inevitability of the deanthropocentrization of culture is being discussed. Arguments are presented in favour of such a course of bio-cultural evolution in which the preservation of the human person in the transhuman and his/her influence on the development of technology applcations will be ensured. The problem of the values and purposes of the transhuman activity and the need to create a technoetics is raised. There is pointed out to the error of reductionist anthropologies. So, the proposal is presented to include personalistic philosophy in resolving ontic, epistemic and moral dilemmas in subsequent phases of the bio-cultural evolution of natural man. In the light of the transhumanist transformation, the problem of the nature-culture relationship is considered.